Abstract| Advances in distributed systems and networking technology have made interoperation not only feasible but also increasingly popular. We de ne the interoperation of secure systems and its security, and prove complexity and composability results on obtaining optimal and secure interoperation. Most problems are NP-complete even for systems with very simple access control structures, while for a general setting the problem is undecidable. Nevertheless, composability reduces complexity in that secure global interoperation can be obtained incrementally by composing secure local interoperation. We illustrate, through an application in secure database interoperation, how these theoretical results can help system designers in practice.
to Bob's les, but not vice versa. Suppose that this organization has just become a subsidiary of a corporation where Charles is Vice President for Research and Diana, being his secretary, has access to his les. After the merger, it seems natural to permit Charles to access Alice's project papers. But if Bob should be allowed access to Diana's le cabinet, there would be a security violation because now Bob would potentially have access (indirectly via Diana and Charles) to Alice's les to which he should be denied access.
Although the security violation in this example may not be too di cult to spot and remove, a real-world system could have hundreds or thousands of entries in its access control list so that choosing a secure yet satisfactory (e.g., with maximum data sharing) mapping between many such access control lists is a daunting task. In other words, interoperation of systems with heterogeneous access control structures poses the following new challenges: what is the de nition of secure interoperation? How can security violations be detected? And how can these violations be removed while a maximum amount of information exchange is still facilitated? This paper attempts to answer some of these questions. First we turn to what we think are the fundamental requirements in secure interoperation.
II. Principles of Secure Interoperation
One essential feature in federated systems is the autonomy of an individual system { that is, each system may be administrated independently 4], 1]. To preserve this feature in secure interoperation, autonomy in security should be guaranteed.
Principle of Autonomy. Any access permitted within an individual system must also be permitted under secure interoperation. On the other hand, interoperation should not violate the security of an individual system. Principle of Security. Any access not permitted within an individual system must also be denied under secure interoperation. Any other new access introduced by interoperation should be permitted unless explicitly denied by the specication of secure interoperation. Note that, unless stated otherwise, by access we mean direct or indirect access. Moreover, we assume that access rules in one system do not con ict with rules in another system. In practice, this assumption is generally satis ed by the fact that the set of one system's entities (e.g., users and les) is typically disjoint from that of another system. Extensions to our approach can handle situations when this assumption does not hold.
It is conceivable that under some circumstances a system may be willing to sacri ce some of its autonomy.
III. General Undecidability
In our discussion, the security attributes of a system are expressed with an access control list (ACL) 5]. We view a system as a collection of users, machines, data objects, and others, each being a distinct unit with regard to security.
The task we are facing is the following: given a set of access control lists, de ne what secure interoperation is and investigate the complexity of detecting security violations in the global system and that of removing security violations while maintaining a reasonable level of interoperation.
It has been previously shown that the security (or safety, as it is sometimes called in the literature) of any given set of access rights and commands is in general undecidable 6], and some variations of the decision problem are at best NPcomplete 7] . Here, we also prove that the general secure interoperation problem is undecidable.
Informally, the security aspect of an interoperation is represented by access rights across systems. That is, given access control lists for individual systems, an interoperation F is a set of access control entries where, for each entry, the subject and the object belong to di erent systems. To satisfy the principle of security, the general problem is to decide if any access that is not permitted in one system is permitted as a result of interoperation.
We formulate our problem following the general denitions by Harrison, Ruzzo, and Ullman 6, Theorem 2, p.469]. A system in the general HRU model consists of a set of access rights and a set of commands. For brevity, we do not repeat the details here, except by noting that the set of access rights { subjects' actions on objects { include create, delete, enter right, remove right, and others. Therefore, informally, an interoperation consists of two individual systems and an additional set of commands that refer to symbols (subjects, objects, and access rights) in both systems. Problem 1: (General Secure Interoperation) Given the access control lists and commands of two systems G 1 and G 2 , an interoperation F, and an access right r in G 1 . Is there a command sequence that will add r to an entry in G 1 , where r previously does not exist and cannot be added by commands in G 1 alone? Theorem 1: General secure interoperation is undecidable.
Proof: Given a safety problem, as de ned by Harrison, Ruzzo, and Ullman, of the form: \Can access right r appear in entry (i; j)?" we can permute the lines and columns of the access control matrix so that entry (i; j) resides at the upper-left corner of the matrix.
We also draw a horizontal line and a vertical one to divide the access matrix into four sections, where the upper left section containing the single entry of (i; j) represents G 1 , the lower right section represents G 2 , and the other two sections represent the interoperation F (see Figure 1 where F 1 F 2 = F).
We then accordingly reassign the commands in the original system as follows. Those commands that do not refer to symbols in G 1 are assigned to belong to system G 2 . All other commands belong to F. Note that, if there is such a command that refers to only symbols in G 1 , we can easily rewrite them so they now refer to symbols in both G 1 and G 2 and yet their functionalities remain unchanged.
Clearly r does not exist in G 1 , and cannot be added by commands in G 1 alone because there is no command in G 1 at all. Now, if the general secure interoperation problem is decidable, then we can decide whether r can be entered into G 1 . Thus we can decide if r can be entered in entry (i; j) in the safety problem. In other words, the general safety problem is also decidable, which is a contradiction.
IV. System Model and Terminology
Given Theorem 1, we expect at best to obtain NPcompleteness results for secure interoperation of systems with more restricted access control structures. We thus follow the usual proof method for NP-completeness to investigate only a restricted problem where in each ACL: (1) each subject owns exactly one le, with read and write access; (2) a subject can have only read access to a le owned by someone else; (3) if a subject can read another's le, the latter cannot read the former's le; (4) an ACL is static, and in particular, read and write are the only types of access speci ed.
Our NP-completeness results should imply similar NPcompleteness results for formations of the problem using more general access control lists. In addition, given the particular restrictions on ACL, our results should also imply NP-completeness results for the interoperation of BellLaPadula type multilevel secure systems 8], 9], although our study is not specially aimed at multilevel security either in the sense of Bell-LaPadula or that of noninterference (e.g., 10]).
In our discussion, we use the following terminology, notations, and de nitions. Because one subject owns exactly one le, there is no need to distinguish between a subject and its le. For example, instead of saying that Alice has access to Bob's le, we can simply say that Alice has access to Bob. We refer to this combination of a subject and its le an entity. Moreover, it is obvious that one entity has access to oneself (i.e., one's own le), and if Alice can access Bob, and Bob can access Charles, then Alice can access Charles indirectly. Recall that one restriction on the ACL is that if Alice can access Bob then Bob cannot access Alice, we arrive at the following de nition of a secure system as speci ed with a restricted ACL. V i where 8(u; v) 2 F, u 2 V i , v 2 V j , and i 6 = j.
The fact that (u; v) 2 F indicates that it is thought that entity u (in system G i ) should be allowed to access entity v (in system G j ). Note that it is possible to have both (u; v) 2 F and (v; u) 2 F.
In our example, suppose that it is decided that interoperation should allow Bob to access Fred (i.e., his le) and Charles to access Alice. Then the global system is in Fig This is similar to a negative entry in an access control list 11]. The purpose is to explicitly safeguard certain parts of the system when the potential implications of introducing F are unclear. In our example, we may forbid access (Diana, Eve). R takes precedence over F. In situations like this, F may need to be changed or reduced to remove security violations (recall that R takes precedence over F). Thus, given G i ; i = 1; : : : ; n, F, and R, our aim is to nd a federated system Q = hW; Bi, where For convenient discussion, we mark all arcs belonging to G i ; i = 1; : : : ; n; green, mark all arcs in the permitted access set F purple, and mark all arcs in the restricted access set R red.
The rst problem we encounter is to decide if a given interoperation is secure. A i S) ? R is secure. This is trivial because S = ; is de nitely a secure solution.
To nd nontrivial secure solutions, one choice is to look for a secure solution that includes all other secure solutions.
In other words, nd S F such that C = ( n i=1 A i S)?R is secure and, for any secure solution T, T S. Unfortunately, such solutions do not always exist, as is shown by the following counterexample.
Consider the interoperation of systems G 1 = hfa1; a2; a3g; f(a1; a2); (a2; a3)gi and G 2 = hfb1; b2; b3g; f(b1; b2); (b2; b3)gi, as illustrated by Figure 5 . An alternative in nding nontrivial secure solutions is to look for solutions that cannot be expanded any further.
In other words, nd a secure solution S F such that, for any secure solution T, S 6 T. This problem is in P, as the following polynomial-time algorithm demonstrates: start with an empty solution S; add elements in F to S one by one, and only if the addition will not cause a security violation (recall that security evaluation is in P); repeat this process until no more elements can be added. The correctness of this algorithm is obvious.
The three choices described so far do not give natural optimality measures. For example, a solution may turn out to contain just one arc from F although the exclusion of this single arc would allow the addition of two other arcs, with the latter intuitively facilitating more information exchange. Therefore, we propose two de nitions that are more natural. From now on, we stipulate that F 6 = ; because the secure interoperation problem disappears when F = ; (and thus R = ;).
One natural optimality measure is to maximize direct data sharing. Take the interoperation represented in Figure Proof: The problem belongs to NP because a nondeterministic machine can guess a solution at random and verify its autonomy and security properties in polynomial time (refer to Theorem 2 on security evaluation).
The rest of the proof is to reduce a known NP-complete problem, the Feedback Arc Set problem 12, p.192] , to a restricted case of our problem at hand. We rst review the Feedback Arc Set problem:
Given a directed graph G = hV; Ai, positive integer K jAj. Is there a subset A 0 A with jA 0 j K such that A 0 contains at least one arc from every directed cycle in G?
The restricted case of Problem 3 is when all individual systems are of the form G i = hfu i ; v i g; f(u i ; v i )gi, F contains no directed cycles, and R = ;. Here, the only type of security violation is a directed cycle (in the federated system) containing a green arc (u i ; v i ), because access from v i to u i would become possible via such a cycle. Moreover, any cycle must contain at least a green arc because there are no red arcs and no all-purple cycles.
Our reduction, shown in Figure 6 , is as follows. A 00 A 0 , we have jSj = jA 0 ?A 00 j = jA 0 j?jA 00 j jA 0 j?K.
Thus, S is a solution to maximum secure interoperation in G 0 .
On the other hand, suppose S is a solution to maximum secure interoperation in G 0 . Since S does not contain directed cycles, A 00 = A 0 ? S must contain at least one arc from each directed cycle in A 0 . Because S A 0 and jSj jA 0 j?K, jA 00 j = jA 0 ?Sj = jA 0 j?jSj jA 0 j?(jA 0 j?K) = K.
Therefore, A 00 is a solution to the Feedback Arc Set problem in G.
For an NP-complete problem, one naturally seeks good approximation algorithms. We now prove that nding certain approximate solutions is also NP-complete. Given a federated system G, we use X(G) to denote a solution obtained by an approximation algorithm, of size jX(G)j, and OPT(G) to denote the optimal solution, of size jOPT(G)j. So far we have been working to nd maximum subsets of F that result in secure interoperation, and Theorem 3 and its corollary suggest that this is hard. Another natural measure of optimality is to maximize direct and indirect information sharing by working on the whole federated system. The aim is to nd a secure interoperation with a maximum number of legal access, instead of looking for a secure solution F of a maximum size. That is, we change F as long as the new F does not introduce an access that is illegal under the initial set F. Proof: The problem obviously belongs to NP because a nondeterministic machine can guess a solution at random and verify its suitability in polynomial time (recall Theorem 2 that security evaluation is in P).
Again, we reduce the Feedback Arc Set problem to a subproblem when each individual system is of the form G i = hfu i ; v i g; f(u i ; v i )gi. Given any G = hV; Ai, our reduction is identical to that in the proof of Theorem 3, as shown in Figure 6 . We compute the transitive closure of the new graph G 0 and call it G 00 = hV 0 ; (A 0 ) + i.
We aim to prove that A 00 is a solution to the Feedback Arc Set problem in G if and only if B = A 0 ? A 00 forms a secure interoperation in G 00 , with jBj jA 0 j ? K.
In the set of arcs introduced by computing the transitive closure, namely ((A 0 ) + ? A 0 ), if an arc is within one single system G i , then it must be of the form (u 2 ; u 1 ), because (u 1 ; u 2 ) is already in G i . Therefore, a new arc in G i will cause a security violation and cannot be present in any secure interoperation. De ne R to be the subset of F) + i. Thus, our objective is to nd the maximum acyclic subgraph of G + that also contains all the green arcs (to preserve autonomy). In other words, we want to remove a minimum number of arcs in order to remove all cycles.
Note that in a transitive closure, the subgraph induced by all vertices on a cycle is a complete graph { where each pair of vertices is connected by arcs in both directions { so G + can be viewed as a collection of complete graphs plus arcs between them. These in-between arcs do not introduce cycles, thus any maximum interoperation must include them. Therefore, our task is reduced to nding in a complete graph the maximum subgraph that does not have cycles (since the number of such complete graphs in G + is polynomial).
By induction, we can easily prove a lemma that for a complete graph of m vertices, the maximum acyclic subgraph (denoted as G (k) 
Given the above lemma, we can arrange the vertices in a left-to-right line such that vertices in V 1 are grouped together rst, from left to right in descending order, so that a vertex can always \access" the one on its right side. Then vertices in V 2 are similarly lined up, and so on. Under such an arrangement, all green arcs are in the direction of left to right. Therefore, we only need to delete all arcs pointing from right to left, which are either purple or yellow, and we have found a maximum acyclic subgraph that contains all the green arcs. The whole process is clearly in polynomial time.
Next we turn to another related problem. Suppose that the initial interoperation is already secure, or that an approximate or optimal solution has been found. Here the set F may contain some arcs that are redundant in the sense that data sharing provided by them is already provided by other permitted access. Therefore, it is quite natural to consider reducing the size of F as much as possible. This result implies that, unless P=NP, any polynomialtime algorithm for nding a secure interoperation cannot guarantee to result in a minimum representation.
Nevertheless, if we remove the constraint that reduction can take place only within F { that is, we ask if there is a F 0 n i=1;j=1;i6 =j V i V j such that jF 0 j K and that the set of legal access remains unchanged when F is replaced by F 0 { then the problem is equivalent to Transitive Reduction 12, p.198], which is solvable in polynomial time. This type of reduction may be useful in a preprocessing step to reduce the problem space of any algorithm used subsequently. However, such a measure means that the setup of individual systems may be changed, which may not be desirable for other reasons.
VI. Composability
To reduce the complexity of nding maximum secure interoperation, one area for exploration is the topology of system interoperation. In some federated systems, for example, interoperation is accomplished by having a master system interacting with other systems in local interoperation 1]. We now prove that in such a con guration, the global interoperation is secure if and only if each local interoperation is secure.
Given systems G i = hV i ; A i i; i = 0; 1; : : :; n, where G 0 is the master system, let G 0?i = hG 0 ; G i ; F i i denote the local interoperation between G 0 and G i with permitted access set F i , i = 1; : : : ; n. The global system is thus Proof: Any local interoperation of a secure global interoperation is automatically secure. Thus we need only to show that the security of all the local interoperation guarantees the security of the global federated system. By two case studies, we show that, in the federated system, there cannot be a legal access that is illegal in either the master system G 0 or a satellite system G i .
Suppose there is an access (a; b) that is legal in the federation but is illegal in the master system G 0 . Because any local interoperation is secure, the chain of access from a to b involves G 0 and at least two other systems. As depicted in Figure 7 , there must be an access chain from a in G 0 to outside, which reenters G 0 at some vertex c, goes out to G i , and reenters G 0 again leading to b.
Clearly access (a; c) must be illegal in G 0 because otherwise access (a; b) would be legal in G 0?i , which contradicts the assumption that G 0?i is a secure local interoperation. But apparently (a; c) is legal in the federated system excluding G i , thus after excluding G i , the rest of the federation must still be insecure. By induction we can see that this implies that there exists an insecure local interoperation G 0?j , a contradiction.
Similarly, suppose there is a access (a; b) that is legal in the federation but is illegal in some satellite system G i ; i 6 = 0. Again, the chain of access from a to b involves G 0 , G i , and at least another system. As depicted in Figure 8 The above theorem implies that local secure interoperation, and thus local maximization, can be computed independently and in parallel. The two very positive results above indicate that in a star-like con guration, global (maximum) secure interoperation can be achieved in a distributed fashion, locally, and incrementally as more systems join the interoperation. We can thus say that (maximum) secure interoperation is composable. Note that these results do not necessarily imply that maximum-access secure interoperation is composable.
The proofs in Theorem 7 clearly extend to any con guration of a tree structure in that if all local interoperation between neighboring systems are secure (and maximum), then the global interoperation is also secure (and maximum).
Corollary 4: (General Federated Secure Interoperation) Secure interoperation and maximum secure interoperation are composable in any tree-structure con guration.
In a ring-structure con guration (or any con guration containing a ring), the composability theorem does not always hold. A simple counterexample is when each F i con- tains only one arc; thus, each local interoperation is secure, but the collection of these plus a green arc forms a cycle and permits an illegal access. The implication is that secure interoperation can be joined together as long as no ring is formed.
From the proof details, we expect that the above composability results generalize beyond the simple access control structure we have assumed in our current discussion.
VII. An Application in Databases
An obvious application area is the interoperation of heterogeneous databases. As more secure databases are built and connected through computer networks, a wide variety of secure data sources is becoming accessible. One of the biggest challenges presented by this technology is the secure interoperation of databases containing data with mismatched access control structures 13]. Providing secure interoperation not only makes it possible to reliably share data in isolated military and civilian databases, but also increases users' con dence and willingness in such sharing.
A key requirement in the interoperation of heterogeneous and especially legacy databases is autonomy 1]. Since these databases were often independently designed to each serve the needs of a single organization, and signi cant investment has already been made into them, the interoperation must respect their autonomy. Our de nition of secure interoperation properly captures the autonomy requirement in security.
The interoperation of secure databases presents new requirements. While the concern in the interoperation of databases with homogeneous access control structures is how to maximize data sharing between databases, such maximization in the interoperation of databases with heterogeneous access control structures has to be tempered by security considerations. In other words, the data sharing caused by database interoperation should not compromise the security of individual databases. This requirement is also properly captured by our de nition of secure interoperation.
Applying our complexity analysis to the autonomous and secure interoperation of heterogeneous databases with mismatched access control structures, we can see that the detection of security breaches in interoperation is easy, and the hard problem is the elimination of security breaches while maximizing data sharing. Although the general problem is not tractable, our results provide useful guidelines in solving this problem in practice. Below are some example guidelines.
Although the general problem is NP-complete, the most common case in multilevel secure databases, where access control structures form total orders, is polynomial-time solvable, as is shown by Theorem 5. Although solving the general problem involves examining globally all the interoperating databases and links between them, for the widely adopted case of federated database systems 1], in which all data sharing is carried out through the federated schema, the problem can be solved in a pairwise manner, as is shown by Theorem 7. This implies that the problem can be solved incrementally as new databases join the federation. In addition, the interoperation of secure databases suggests other natural optimality measures, whose computational complexity we are studying now. For example, we might want to maximize the number of databases interoperable, thus an optimal solution might link as many databases as possible, even if the amount of data sharing is not necessarily maximized.
VIII. Related Work
Secure interoperation can in some sense also be viewed as composing secure systems. A number of composition methods have been proposed for building a large system out of secure components (e.g., 14]). These previous results are mostly focused on composing systems with identical or compatible security attributes or policies, and tend to treat the avoidance of covert channels as the most important requirement. We deal with secure interoperation of systems with heterogeneous security attributes, and the composition method we examine is a very natural one that has been used frequently in practice.
Another related work is a study of interoperation of multilevel secure databases 15], where the problem is security label translation. Like us, these researchers recognize that naive interoperation may cause security violations. They de ne a notion called relation consistency and propose a label insertion algorithm to achieve that. But unlike us, they do not provide any complexity or composability result.
A canonical security model was proposed for federated databases 13], where the main concern is the integration of heterogeneous security policies and the speci cation of security constraints in a federated schema. However, the problem of detecting and eliminating security breaches in a federated schema is not considered.
IX. Summary and Future Work
We have studied the problem of secure interoperation of systems with heterogeneous access control structures. We formed the de nition of secure interoperation on the following basic notions: autonomy, which dictates that legal access in one system should remain legal in the global system, and security, which says that illegal access within one system should remain illegal in the global system. We proved that, while the security of a general interoperation is undecidable, nding a secure solution with some optimality is NP-complete even for a very simple type of access control list. Thus, nding similar optimal solutions for more general access control lists can only be harder. Nevertheless, composability reduces complexity in that secure global interoperation can be obtained incrementally by composing secure local interoperation. These results, as shown by the database application discussed, can help steer system design e ort to searching for approximation algorithms and partial optimization, for example, by using heuristic algorithms.
For future work, one direction is to improve the theoretical results. This includes obtaining results on the hardness of obtaining percentage-wise approximation solutions, where some recent work 16] may be helpful, and investigating other optimality measurements that are applicable to particular environments. We have so far assumed that R represents direct access that are undesirable, such as a negative entry in an access control list. This means that an indirect access may still be possible, as in the case of a typical discretionary access control scheme. If we interpret restricted access as banning both direct and indirect access, then similar theorems might be obtained. For example, Theorem 2 trivially holds. Theorem 3 (and its corollary) should also hold because its proof is about the subcase when R = ;. Developing near-optimal algorithms, possibly probabilistic algorithms, to obtain good average-case performance is also desirable.
Another direction is to examine ways to distribute the process of removing security violations from a central control point to individual systems, for example, by de ning interfaces that preserve security. This is analogous to the development of distributed concurrency control. We can also explore various topologies of system interoperation, as in Theorem 7. Another possibility is to divide the overall task of nding maximum secure interoperation into preprocessing and run-time processing, because the latter on average probably does not involve a large number of separate systems. This idea of delaying the decision to run time can have other bene ts. For example, given two permitted access that together will violate security, instead of deciding a priori (and somewhat arbitrarily) to remove one of them, we can decide to keep the one that is used rst during run time. This is similar to the Chinese Wall policy (e.g., 17]) where one access will automatically prohibit future access of another kind, but which access to prohibit is not decided in advance.
